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.2. 
Realism and Irrealisrn: A Dialogue 
MARK S. MCLEOD 
IRREALIST: Why do you realists think there is a singular, real world? 
REALIST: By "real" we mean that there exists a world and that it is what 
completely independent of how I (or we) think about it, cognize about it, b 
about it, know about it, and so forth. The relationship between the worl 
our cognitive dealings with it, although not worked out in some final sen 
basically one of the world's existing in some mind-independent manner and 
causing or influencing our thinking, believing, cognizing, and so forth about 
IRREALIST: You've told me what you believe, but not why. The assum · 
you make in what you just said are typically taken to be common sense, 
what argument is there for them? 
REALIST: I don't need an argument to defend common sense since the other·· 
sition, antirealism, is so counterintuitive and itself without any decent argum 
IRREALIST: Counterintuitive it is. I agree. But it's not without argument. C 
sider this one, for example. Take any two apparently contradictory metaph 
cal claims. Suppose, for the moment, each claim is equally well epistem· 
justified (warranted, known, etc.). Add to those claims the additional pr 
that contradictions are impossible. What metaphysical conclusion should 
reach? The most straightforward result is that there is more than one world 
that truth is world-relative. 
For example: 
( r) Contradictions are impossible. 
(2) Metaphysical freedom exists. 
(3) Metaphysical freedom does not exist. 
(4) Therefore, there are at least two worlds, one in which metaphysical free· 
dom exists, one in which it does not. 
( 5) Therefore, truth is world-relative. 
REALIST: Before I give you what I take to be the obvious solution to the pr 
!em, let me ask what you mean by "world." How can there be two or 
worlds? For example, is the action I'm now performing both free and not f 
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I guess you'd say not. But then how are there two worlds? Do they over-
space and time? Do they somehow mysteriously coalesce? The notion of 
r more worlds that are somehow coextensive seems to be just crazy. 
LIST: The term "worlds" is Nelson Goodman's, and I must admit that 
t very clear about what it comes to. And I don't want to get bogged down 
issue. Perhaps we can work on it some other day. But I will say that if 
't prefer the multiple world talk, we could restate the argument in terms 
el Lynch's account of a singular world presenting itself to various 
lizers" in radically distinct and incompatible ways. He cashes out 
by giving an account of "world," "object," and "existence" as fluid. He 
t just as we can apply terms such as "object" and "existence" in a fluid 
, so we can apply terms such as "world" fluidly. We haven't switched 
s. We've just extended, implicitly, our shared notion of reality. 1 For sim-
sake, however, we can keep talking about worlds. The force of the ar-
t can still be seen. 
UST: Well, I'm not sure that Lynch's position works either, but let's pass 
the issue of worlds. Your argument still fails because we all know that (2) 
(3) cannot both be true. You ask us to suppose that (2) and (3) are equally 
mically justified. Why should we accept that, if it gives us an absurd con-
n? And even if we do accept it, it doesn't follow that both are true. That 
istemic or cognitive abilities can't help us decide between two claims 
't ever entail that both are true. Epistemology isn't metaphysics. Indeed, 
ommon error of a good many antirealists is to confuse our epistemic limits 
the way the world really is. 
ALI ST: First of all, let me say that I'm neither fish nor foul. I think the best 
on might lie not in antirealism nor in realism but in irrealism, somewhere 
antirealism and realism. I take antirealists to have taken things into 
hands, or minds, so to speak. I'm not willing to follow them there, for 
one to a kind of radical relativism I can't bring myself to hold. I'm not 
ng for just anything that a person happens to believe to be true. Neverthe-
I can't see that the world is only "one way" without any kind of contribu-
from our epistemic activity. Somehow our rational activity influences the 
the world is (or the ways they are). 
rticular, the argument indicates that our epistemic activity, our "epis-
g," if you will, contributes to the world-or worlds. Here I must say that 
t prepared to say exactly how our epistemizing contributes to the 
(s), simply that it does. But I will have to be cautious here and note that 
gument is about epistemizing and not cognizing. I want to set aside the 
cognizing" of the world for our discussion and talk just about how our 
ting claims vis-a-vis truth might "make worlds." I set aside "mere cogniz-
not because I think it doesn't play a role but because the argument I've pre-
Michael Lynch, Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity (Cambridge: 
1998), 95. 
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sented doesn't apply to mere cognizing in the neat way it applies to 
ing. It may be helpful just to start with the neater argument before moving 
the messier one. 
So, as I've said, I'm not happy with the crazy position that simply 
makes p true. But neither am I happy with the so-called commonsense po.s1t1on14! 
that the world is merely "lying around out there" for us to form beliefs about 
with us humans then hoping that there is some sort of accurate connection 
tween the "way the world is" and our "justified" beliefs about it. So my 
tion isn't as clearly developed as I'd like it to be. I will suggest, without "1-'~·H"'"' 
out in detail, the notion that truth is (in part, at least) an epistemic notion 
that somehow the world's being the way it is (or the worlds' being the ways 
are) is due to our epistemic contributions. I'm not willing to say with Rorty 
truth is what our peers will let us get away with, nor would I finally want to 
that some individual human's epistemizing is enough to "make a world," but 
neither am I willing to say that truth is completely independent of our eo1sti~m1c 
activity, where by "epistemic" I mean the rational activity of forming and 
fying (or warranting, etc.) beliefs. So I think the argument is instructive to help 
us get onto the right track about some of these matters. 
For clarity's sake, what do I want to argue and how do I want to approach 
it? First, the approach. I want us to take your typical realist claim that episte-
mology and metaphysics are two different things seriously and not slip and 
between the two. At first blush, it certainly seems as if our epistemizing activi-
ties are distinct from the metaphysics of the world. So, prima facie, to say that p 
is true-a term most straightforwardly understood as metaphysical and not 
epistemic-is not the same as saying that p is believed, justified, known, taken 
to be true, thought to be true, accepted, and so forth. These latter terms are best 
understood as epistemic. We can say these terms are epistemizing terms, terms 
of epistemic evaluations or weightings. I take it that the realist wants to keep a 
stark line drawn between metaphysics (truth) and epistemology. The issue 
whether the epistemizing of humans influences the truth of a statement simply 
doesn't arise for the realist. So let's keep the issues separate. My question is, 
then, what happens when we strip (r), (2), and (3) of epistemic evaluations and 
weightings? The argument concludes that what follows logically, given the truth 
of (r), (2), and (3), is (4) and (5). I want to argue, then, that a strict keeping of 
the dichotomy between our epistemizing and reality puts pressure on the notion 
that truth is purely a metaphysical concept. 
REALIST: My reply is easy to see. We should simply take some one of (r), (2}, 
and ( 3 ) to be false. 
IRREALIST: Why? 
REALIST: Because the laws of logic demand it. If (2) and (3) really do contra-
dict each other, one must be false. That's the law of noncontradiction. I heard 
Peter van Inwagen give a simple argument against this position once. It goes like 
this. First, if W1 is actual, then freewill exists. Second, if W2 is actual, then 
freewill does not exist. Third, it is not both the case that freewill exists and that 
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does not exist. Therefore, it's either not the case that freewill exists or 
case that freewill does not exist. 
LIST: So van lnwagen is a realist, and he says that my (r), (2), and (3) 
all be true. Since contradictions are impossible, either (2) or (3) must be 
It makes more sense to reject as false one of (2) or (3) than to reach the ab-
onclusion that there is more than one world. But that argument surely 
y point. First, van Inwagen's third premise rests on an interpretation of 
of noncontradiction, namely, a realist interpretation. Without that real-
pretation, his third premise doesn't go together with his first and second 
his conclusion. Furthermore, van Inwagen's argument is legitimate if we 
ically value the negation of (4) or (5) more highly than (r), (2), or (3). 
he slips in some epistemic rankings again, precisely what we agreed to 
t of our discussion. 
IST: I admit that we cannot access the world without epistemizing. That 
plied by the realist position. The world is "out there" independent of our 
"zing it, but if one is to know about it, one must engage in some episte-
al enterprise or other. Neither irrealism nor antirealism follows from 
fact. Furthermore, that neither irrealism nor antirealism follows from the 
ssity of epistemizing to access the world doesn't show that we can talk 
t metaphysical matters stripped of all epistemizing. Of course we know 
(r) is true and that therefore either (2) or (3) is false. So we don't have to 
(4) or ( 5). In fact, there is no pair of contradictory statements both of which 
t admit is true. We can always take one of them to be false. So this kind 
ment will never force us to the conclusion that there is more than one 
l:!ALIST: Your reply begs the question against irrealism. You say the world 
e way it is and that our epistemizing has nothing to do with it, thus setting 
any role for epistemic weighting or ranking. But when I want to agree 
you and actually set aside epistemic rankings, you reject my suggestion. 
cannot say that epistemizing must be set aside when doing so favors realism 
yet appeal to it when the argument runs against realism. Either we can use 
emizing to decide metaphysical issues or not. If we can epistemically rank-
r the premises and thereby decide metaphysical issues, then our epistemiz-
contributes to the way the world is and irrealism wins. If we cannot, then 
foregoing irrealist argument goes through, pure logic wins, and there is 
than one world. Either way, irrealism wins. 
LIST: Aren't you trading on an ambiguity among two distinct meanings of 
ision"? One is an epistemic sense of decision, as in "I decide which state-
is true," that is, I decide which way to believe. The other is a metaphysical 
, as in "I decide which way the world is going to be," that is, the world is 
d to be the way it is by my believing it to be so. On the one hand, if you 
the latter meaning, then your argument might find success, but I see no rea-
to take the latter, as it is surely an absurd notion. On the other hand, the 
mer allows that the world is what it is, all the while keeping our discovery of 
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the world a completely independent enterprise. We can take our best episte 
shot at the world, but our believing one way rather than another has no ca 
link (from belief to world) at all. 
IRREALIST: Perhaps. But if that is the case, then at best you realists are 
with being able to discuss only worlds as you epistemize them and not the w 
itself. Your realism precludes ever getting at the world, and we are left wi 
very radical form of skepticism. The world known (reasoned about, ar 
over, etc.) is the world epistemized and not the world as it is in itself. Rea 
can never claim to know or, for that matter, rationally to surmise that thew 
itself is a realist world. What grounds could you produce except grounds 
tered through your epistemic weightings and rankings? You can never 
about the world itself. You can only talk about the world as you rank-order 
And isn't that what so many antirealists are saying these days? There is no 
ference between the world we talk about and the world as it is. To suggest 
the world is a singular, fixed way is to assume something we cannot show w 
out epistemizing. Either there is no functional difference between "the wor 
and "the world epistemized by me (or us)" or "the world" is simply beyond 
means and we cannot talk about it. 
But perhaps I should have been more circumspect earlier. Let's get rid of 
"decision" talk and consider this way of putting the irrealist argument. 
(I) Contradictions are impossible. 
(2') p 
(3') -P 
(4') Therefore, there is more than one world, one in which Pis true, another 
in which -P is true. 
( 5) Therefore, truth is world-relative. 
Consider also this supporting argument. 
(A) Either our epistemizing (1-3') contributes (somehow) to the truth of 
( l-3 ') or it does not. 
(B) If our epistemizing (1-3') contributes (somehow) to the truth of (1-3'), 
then irrealism obtains. 
(C) If our epistemizing (1-3') does not contribute (somehow) to the truth of 
(1-3'), then the irrealist argument is successful, and irrealism obtains. 
(D) Therefore, irrealism obtains. 
REALIST: I don't see how (B) or (C) are to go. 
IRREALIST: Taken straightforwardly, premise (B) simply gives us irrealism. 
Suppose we epistemize (1-3'). The antecedent of (B) then is either true or false. 
If it is true, then the truth of ( l-3 ') depends somehow on our epistemizing them, 
in which case there is surely more than one way the world is, for there is more 
than one way to epistemize ( l-3' ). Truth thus is world-relative. Irrealism ob· 
tains. But if the antecedent of (B) is false, then the truth of (1-3 ')has nothing to 
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,with epistemizing and thus epistemizing is irrelevant to the irrealist argu-
Just presented. This irrelevance drives a large wedge between epistemol-
d metaphysics, precisely what the realist typically claims. Thus ( C) comes 
play. 
uST: I can grant that, but (C) appears to be the truly controversial move. 
LIST: The antecedent of (C) says that the truth of (r-3 ') is in no way 
by our epistemic stance toward (r-3 '). So if we do not in any way epis-
the premises in the irrealist argument, then we cannot appeal to reasons 
any of the premises. That leaves three possibilities with regard to the 
or falsity of (r-3 ').Before we explore those possibilities, however, it is im-
t to note that the discussion is focused not on defending the truth of 
) (that would be to rank them epistemically) but rather on understanding 
true epistemic neutrality looks like in regard to this argument. 
IST: I see. So the issue isn't whether we actually have evidence for or 
the truth of any of the premises. Rather, the question is, since we aren't 
to appeal to such evidence, how are we to treat (r-3')? 
LI s T: That's it. And as it turns out, it looks as if the position that claims 
premises are true is at least as viable as any other position-in fact supe-
some-and therefore the argument goes through. 
IST: I don't see why I should buy that conclusion. 
LIST: Here's why. Let's consider the possible combinations of truth val-
the premises. First, let's suppose all the premises are false. There is no 
for realism here. Because all three are false, (r) is false. But then contra-
s would be possible and that is a fate worse than irrealism, for then any-
es. We are left with a true and complete antirealism that is no better 
adical relativism. So if we get irrealism if (r-3 ') are true, we get a kind 
ealism if (r) is false. Taking this route won't help you. 
T: I'll surely admit that. 
IST: The second possibility is that some of (r-3 ') are true and others 
t which ones? We can tell right away that it won't be (r) that is false, 
rendering the worlds not only multiple but completely relative. That 
with (2') and (3'). Although it is possible that one is true and the other 
out introducing some reason to pick one over another (which, by as-
n, we cannot do, for that is to epistemize them), we look to be on shaky 
Why should we take the situation one way rather than another? Ac-
to the realist dichotomy between epistemizing and reality, believing, 
, taking, accepting, and so forth have nothing to do with the way real-
you've been wont to point out. We must remain epistemically neutral. 
ot, by supposition, epistemically rank-order the premises one way or 
sT: I guess that's all right. 
LlsT: That leaves the third possibility, that (r-3') are all true. But then 
(5) follow, and irrealism obtains! One could suggest that evidence can 
aled against (r), (2'), or (3 '). But to marshal such evidence is to epis-
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temize the premises. Again, we can't do that, by supposition. Hence if we are 
consistent in not introducing epistemic rank-ordering, then the irrealist argue 
ment is successful, and irrealism obtains. 
REA LI s T: I still say that the world is the way it is completely independent of th~ 
way we relate to it epistemically. I see how the first and third possibilities go,'. 
But I'm not really convinced by the second. Why can't we just retreat to the PO" 
sition that we don't know which of (2') and (3') is false, but that one must be 
true while the other is false? We don't have to introduce epistemic rankings 
here. We just have to admit that one isn't true. 
IRREALIST: So you would be willing to admit that realism is stuck between the, 
rock of admitting that epistemizing contributes to the metaphysical nature of 
the world and the hard place of skepticism. 
REALIST: Yes, I think that's fine. My realism may leave the world a little mys-
terious, but that isn't anything new. 
IRREALIST: Yes. But I believe you are actually worse off than that. As it turns 
out, there is no noncircular way of being a realist, once you retreat to the posi· 
tion of admitting that you could be wrong about the way the world is. 
REALIST: Now you accuse us realists not only of skepticism but of circularity? 
IRREALIST: Yes. My premise (r) is actually metaphysically neutral between 
there being a singular world and multiple worlds. That is, although ( r) is takert 
to be true, there is no built-in commitment to a realist interpretation of the law 
of noncontradiction over against an irrealist interpretation. We irrealists can, 
and desire to, hold onto (1). One difference between you realists and we irreal-
ists on this score is that we, following the strict distinction between epistemo-
logical projects and the metaphysics of the situation, want to remain epistemi-
cally neutral about (1) through (5). By remaining neutral in this way, we get the 
conclusions (4') and (5). About this, we irrealists are quite sanguine. How can 
you realists avoid these irrealist conclusions? What reason can you proffer to 
defend the single-world interpretation of (r)? None. Except, perhaps, to assert 
that there is only one world, and along with it the realist interpretation of the 
law of noncontradiction. But that is the realist thesis itself. And surely that begs 
the question against us irrealists. Realism is not the default position on these 
matters. Irrealism is on ground just as solid. Unless, of course, you introduce 
some epistemic ranking among the premises. But that puts us back to the earlier 
challenge. 
REALIST: Well, can't I offer some set of reasons for realism? 
IRREALIST: What would those be, except more already epistemized reasons? 
And therein lies the rub. Any reasons you realists offer will in fact count toward 
irrealism's truth, for they will all be epistemized reasons. When they are 
stripped of epistemic rankings, there simply is no reason to opt for realism over 
irrealism, without circularity. 
REALIST: Well, on the grounds you've appealed to, circular reasoning is ac-
ceptable, for we know that any proposition follows from that proposition if we 
stick to logic. "p therefore p" is perfectly valid, deductively. 
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)\LIST: Yes, but that proves my point and doesn't help yours at all. There 
kinds of odd things about deductive logic, stripped of all epistemic con-
One of them is that logic alone cannot tell us anything about the 
... or the worlds. Logic is at best neutral vis-a-vis these matters. 
sT: But aren't you irrealists in the same skeptical boat? Why should we 
accept your conclusion? What evidence have you provided? 
LIST: We've provided (1), (2') and (3'). And you can substitute whatever 
for P and-P. Perhaps that there is a God and that there isn't a God will 
maybe that humans have rights based in our natures and that humans do 
e rights based in our natures. And so on. Pick your favorite metaphysi-
and draw from it two contradictory claims. All we need is some argu-
th contradictory statements substituted for P and-P. We do not offer 
epistemically ranked propositions. We offer the bare logic of the situa-
need no other reason. The strict separation of epistemic concerns from 
sical ones opens the door to irrealism, just the opposite result from 
realists often claim. 
IST: But aren't you, too, slipping in some epistemology here? You, after 
(r), (2'), and (3 ')to be true. Why should we realists accept this presup-
? 
LIST: We've already gone over that ground. What alternative have you 
ou are down to (2') and (3 '). If you rank-order them, then you, too, are 
one to be true over the other and then irrealism's won. If you simply say 
must be false, although you have no way to determine which one, 
slipped in a realist interpretation of (1). Our taking (1), (2'), and (3') to 
is simply admitting that irrealism is correct, that truth is world-relative, 
at our epistemizing the world is world-shaping. 
ST: Still, the world is the way it is independent of my epistemizing it. 
LIST: Do I detect a little metaphysical foot stomping here? Why should I 
that? 
ST: Why should I accept your absurd position, with more than one 
LIST: Because I was just following your rules and trying to describe the 
ithout epistemically weighting the description. The onus is on you to 
the superiority of your position. I've given my argument. What's yours? 
IST: Well, I know the law of noncontradiction is true. 
~LIST; I agree, but it's metaphysically neutral vis-a-vis realism and irreal-
that's not going to help you much. 
ST: Sure. But the law of noncontradiction applies in all worlds, right? 
LIST: That depends on what you mean. It applies in all the worlds there 
ppose. I'm not talking about merely possible worlds. I mean the actual 
IST: Precisely. There is no world such that the law of noncontradiction 
't apply. What about the world of worlds, or if you like, the superworld? 
law of noncontradiction apply there? Your argument seems to operate 
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that way. (r) seems to be true universally, and therefore you can allow for the 
contradiction between (21) and (3') and yet also for both to be true. You can do 
this because there is a kind of superworld of worlds for it to range over. 
IRREALIST: Let's grant that for the moment. 
REALIST: But then how about this argument? 
( r) Contradictions are impossible. 
(2 11 ) There is only one world. 
(3 11 ) There is more than one world. 
(4 11 ) Therefore, there are at least two superworlds, one in which there is only 
one world, one in which there is more than one. 
(5') Therefore, truth is superworld-relative. 
You can see where this is going. First superworlds, then supersuperworlds, then 
supersupersuperworlds, and so on. Pretty soon, we are in infinitely bad shape, 
with more worlds than we can shake a metaphysical stick at. There is a reason 
to reject your initial argument. It shows far too much. 
IRREALIST: I don't think so. 
REALIST: Don't tell me you're willing to buy an infinite regress too. 
IRREALIST: I'm not sure. I've always wondered exactly what is wrong with 
them. As a realist, I suppose I would be worried. But as an irrealist, it's a whole 
lot less clear. Does it matter whether there are just two worlds or an infinite 
number of worlds? Once we've planted the garden, let a thousand flowers 
bloom-or maybe even an infinite number of flowers! There is no logical incon-
sistency in superworlds or supersuperworlds. It's a little uncomfortable and cer-
tainly more than I can imagine. But philosophers ought to be used to that. 
But then again, I'm not sure that superworlds are the same as worlds. Per-
haps we should put a stop to your argument before it gets off the ground. Per-
haps we should just say that superworlds don't function like worlds at all, for 
then we'd have problems with the law of noncontradiction. 
REALIST: How so? 
IRREALIST: What I am concerned with is that by holding so fast to the law of 
noncontradiction I've admitted too much. Perhaps there is some single facet of 
all worlds that is common among them. And isn't that a sort of singular, realist 
superworld? 
REALIST: Precisely. I was coming back to that. Not only does your argument 
seem to allow for an infinite regress of worlds; it also seems to admit that there 
is at least one singular facet of the worlds that is fixed, namely, the law of non-
contradiction. Maybe that is all the world really is independent of us, and the 
rest we add. But then we realists have gotten our lever, and although perhaps 
we won't move the world, we can at least show that there is some aspect of the 
world that doesn't depend upon our epistemizing. 
IRREALIST: Maybe you are right. But have you gotten a piece of the world 
without epistemizing? Don't you, as well as I, just hold the law of noncontra-
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on to be true? Haven't we "made the world" by believing that that is the 
way we can make sense of the world? Perhaps that was inchoately behind 
earlier point that we irrealists too beg the question, simply in the opposite 
tion from you. We assume the law of noncontradiction, as do you. We take 
way, with lots of worlds. You take it the other way, with only one world. 
is "right," and how do we decide? I've been thinking that taking things to 
e by assumption, as we do in working logic proofs, is not an epistemic 
But by assuming that, wasn't I giving away my store? Wasn't I leaving the 
simply beyond my reach, which is what I've been accusing you of all 
? So maybe the world really is mysterious, even on my irrealist view. 
IsT: Precisely. 
ALI ST: But we shouldn't move too quickly here. There may be a good re-
e. Haven't we just admitted that we have to epistemize the law of noncon-
'on in order to solve anything here? We have to take it to be true? 
ALI ST: Well, you have, at any rate. 
REALIST: But what is the force of that "have to"? I said, "We have to, in 
to solve anything here." That is, we have to in order to describe the world. 
't the law of noncontradiction itself then nothing more than an epistemic 
ple, a way of constructing the world? Why take it to be a metaphysical 
ent? Or if it is, its metaphysical status is identical to its epistemological 
. What I mean is that the law of noncontradiction has the ontological sta-
has because it has the epistemic status it has. That is, it is true because it 
es with the rest of our epistemic web of belief, warrant, rationality, knowl-
or what have you. It is true because we take it as fundamental to getting 
in the world, that is, for describing the world. Its not being true would 
too weird epistemically and metaphysically. Now of course you realists will 
nt to introduce your "but we could be wrong" strategy here. However, it 
't dear how to do that. What we all need is for the law of noncontradiction 
ply to be (part of) the way the world is. It looks, however, as if it can't have 
status, even on the grounds of logic alone, without our epistemizing. In 
sense, it is true because it is the "way things are," and yet it is true because 
tis the way we take it. It is hard to tell the difference. In fact, I see no differ-
e in this case. But then that falls right into our irrealist hands and we win. 
he world is the way we take it to be. Or the world makes us take it this way. 
here is one thing we can't be mistaken about, and that is the law of noncon-
adiction. But that isn't because that is the way the world is and therefore our 
· ds are caused to think that way. Instead, as Kant saw long ago, the world is 
way it is with regard to the law of noncontradiction because our minds 
e it" so. We epistemize the world. Indeed, there is no distinction between 
the world is and the way we epistemize it, at least on the most funda-
;l'nental of levels. No, irrealism still comes through in the end. I take back my 
er hesitation. The world is not beyond our ken, not because it's "out there" 
we have minds that can conform to it. Rather, because we are here, and the 
orld or worlds conform to us. 
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REALIST: Two comments. First, Kant at least believed in some sort of univ 
sality for the rational mind's operations. Your position seems no better off, 
the final analysis, than the kind of radical relativism you rejected earlier. Sure 
something isn't true simply because I believe it is. Second, and this I want to 
plore a bit, don't we still have to account for the infinite regress problem? I 
one thing to say that there are many worlds and truth is relative to them. It 
another to say that there are many, perhaps infinitely many, superworlds a 
that truth is relative to them. Aren't we just forced into the kind of radical rela.; 
tivism you earlier wanted to avoid by affirming the law of noncontradiction? 
Isn't the notion of truth here just getting a little too thin? It seems more like 
make-believe-I believe it and therefore I make it so. 
IRREALIST: Well, all right. I wasn't really happy with my earlier response t(} 
this issue either. Perhaps I have gotten us into an unhappy infinite regress. Is 
there some way to avoid this unhappiness? 
REALIST: Let me suggest something, in the unlikely hope that you'll agree. 
IRREALIST: I'm not opposed to taking help from my metaphysical enemies. Go 
ahead! 
REALIST: What if you stop the regress with God? 
IRREALIST: Surely you jest. Irrealists are trying to get away~from a "God's 
eye" point of view. 
REALIST: Hear me out. Following your arguments, there are many worlds be-
cause there are conflicting true statements about the world taken as a singular 
world. Similarly, just as there are apparent conflicts that generate the various 
worlds with their various contents, so are there apparent conflicts among 
world-descriptions that generate various superworlds. This is the source of the 
infinite regress. 
IRREALIST: Yes. 
REALIST: On your grounds, we can't stop the infinite regress by reducing all 
the worlds to one, as the materialist might be accused of. Instead, let's look for 
some unifying (as opposed to reducing) feature. 
IRREALIST: What do you mean? 
REALIST: Goodman says that we build worlds out of other worlds.2 One might 
thus suppose that there is a first world. Whence this first world? Goodman sug-
gests that the search for a universal or necessary beginning world is best left to 
theology. Taking our cue from Goodman, but applying the suggestion to the 
"superworld problem," let's turn to theology to help us avoid the infinite regress 
of worlds. 
IRREALIST: Go ahead. 
REALIST: In short, God is going to help you. God, too, is a world maker, al-
though he has a different sort of ontological status than we do. And he provides 
the unification of all the worlds created by us. 
IRREALIST: But how can God help? Isn't God just one more person making up 
1 See Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, I978). 
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lds? How can God be a unifying factor without himself getting caught up in 
beliefs and attitudes and other world-making activities? 
LIST: We have to go back to something earlier in our conversation first. At 
point you suggested that any two contradictory pairs of statements would 
your argument off the ground. One of your examples was "God exists" and 
oesn't exist." Obviously, if we are to use God as the ground of unity, 
n't be "in" one world and not in another. 
ALIST: True enough. But I don't see how you can treat God differently 
any other controversial piece of metaphysical furniture. 
1sT: Well, I can because God isn't a piece of metaphysical furniture. He is 
our world or worlds and yet in the worlds. Just as for a while we 
t the law of noncontradiction might resolve our debate on the side of re-
' so now God might. 
ALIST: Well, I said that the law of noncontradiction was an epistemic 
'ple and therefore counted on the irrealist side. How are you to keep God 
falling into the same problem? Why isn't God just an epistemic posit, just 
the law of noncontradiction is? 
ALI s T: One of the things that bothers realists about irrealism is its tendency 
d relativism. Even if your position avoids the radical relativism created 
one denies the law of noncontradiction, your final conclusion, ( 5 ), has 
relative to worlds. 
'REALIST: True enough. But I think I can avoid relativism of a radical sort 
least, noting that we all, realist and irrealist alike, appeal to the law of 
ontradiction, thus making the world or worlds one way rather than an-
LIST: But that doesn't seem to be enough. For if the law of noncontradic-
is epistemic, then what is to stop someone, or all of us, from simply deny-
it? 
EALIST: Yes, I have to worry about that. 
ALI ST: And doesn't your position simply give us humans far too much abil-
to shape the world? 
EALIST: Yes, I worry about that too. 
IST: Perhaps these two worries are connected. 
EALIST: Yes, I suspect so. But on my irrealism, not just anything will go. 
re are limits to what will count as true in any given singular world, even if 
nts ruled as false in one world are true in some other world. 
ALI ST: I understand that. But that is grounded in your acceptance of the law 
noncontradiction. 
'REALIST: Yes, I suppose it is. 
rsT: So we face a dilemma. Either realism obtains and there are objective 
to the way a world can be but we are stuck with (potential) skepticism 
t the world, or irrealism obtains and we avoid skepticism, but only at the 
of (potential) radical relativism. 
EALIST: I think that is the best we can do. 
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REALIST: That is where God enters the picture. 
IRREALIST: How so? 
REALIST: God is not part of the world, or any world, in the sense that God 
just another thing in the world. God, put in Platonic terms, is like the Good 
beyond simple being. God is the underlying ground of contingent being, but 
isn't a being as we are. 
IRREALIST: So is God real or not? That is to say, is God something that· 
what God is, independent of our thinking about him, conceptualizing him, 
lieving things about him, and so forth? 
REALIST: Yes, God is real, but he is not just another thing. God is the ultima 
Reality. God is the objectivity in an otherwise nonobjective world. 
IRREALIST: Surely God is just another epistemic posit, though. 
REALIST: No. God is needed not just epistemically but metaphysically. Here 
why. If irrealism obtains, then the world is as it is, or worlds are as they are, 
cause of our epistemic contributions. 
IRREALIST: Yes. 
REALIST: And if irrealism obtains, it's possible for us to deny the law of non'? 
contradiction and so remove the so-called objective limits on what can be in a 
world. 
IRREALIST: Yes. 
REALIST: I have questions, then. If I (or we) make the world, then how do I (or 
we) get here? What is my source? 
IRREALIST: So irrealism is a sort of underground argument for God's existence?'. 
REALIST: Yes, but we have to careful about the notion of existence. I think one 
of the oddities of irrealism, at least atheistic irrealism, is that it leaves unex-
plained, and perhaps unexplainable, the age-old question of why there is any· 
thing at all. It may be right that I contribute something to the world's being the 
way it is. But if that's all there is to the story, I am the creator of the world, and 
even the creator of myself. Yet we are deeply suspicious that the world doesn't 
depend in this way upon me. I am simply part of the world, and I can't make 
myself up. I am contingent. There must be something outside the world, so to 
speak, to account for it. And the existence of that outside "something" can't 
just be contingent. And yet that something must be able to bring things about in 
the world. 
IRREALIST: I see. And there is the place for God, the Being beyond simple being. 
REALIST: Yes. Now if God made the world and then made us, we don't have to 
bear the burden of causing the world. But we can't take God's involvement in 
our world to follow the rules we are used to. But if your argument about our 
epistemic contribution to world-making is correct, we have to allow that God 
would make us as creative beings who can influence the way the world is as 
well. But we all recognize that there are limits to what we can do. Those limits, 
I suggest, derive from God, the Being beyond simple being. 
IRREALIST: What becomes of the dilemma you stated earlier? Is it true that ei-
ther realism obtains and there are objective limits to the way a world can be but 
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stuck with skepticism about the world, or irrealism obtains and we avoid 
, but only at the cost of radical relativism? 
: We go between the horns. There is a middle position between realism 
lism. It is something like irrealism but it is theistic. Not only does God 
e first world(s) into which we then enter and build and change and 
but God also is the unifier of the worlds. He controls how things finally 
one thing, he epistemizes the law of noncontradiction, so it isn't just left 
. But then neither is God's existence left up to us. God is a metaphysical 
ent to avoid radical relativism, but he is also a requirement to avoid 
m about the world(s). 
LIST: How do you remove skepticism? 
sT: That is not so obvious, is it? There are a couple of things worth 
out. First, now that we have God, we have some reason to think that 
ould make our epistemic abilities conducive, generally, to getting truth 
the world. Second, the worlds are, to some extent, the way they are by 
· temizing them. So there isn't such an extreme gap, so to say, between 
the world is, or at least certain aspects of the world, and one's epistem-
it. 
ALI ST: Would we need to worry about the first point if the second is true? 
, isn't the first true trivially because of the second? 
IsT: Perhaps that is right. But none of this will work without God, and 
ight say that because God made our epistemic abilities conducive to 
e, he made us as irrealist contributors to the world(s). But on this kind 
irrealism, there are some things, or aspects of things, that are beyond 
.·contributions-the law of noncontradiction being contributed by God to 
'worlds, for example. And if you want to get beyond the worlds, God himself 
made up by us. 
Ji'ALIST: How do we know God, then? 
LIST: God, as outside the world, can reveal himself to us through some 
s other than our typical epistemic abilities. I think, for example, this is 
happens in Christian, and perhaps all theistic, mystical experience. There 
no skepticism left in the recipient of God's showing himself this way. A 
on report among recipients of mystical experiences is that they know God 
assuredly than they know anything else. One reason for that might just be 
instead of simply knowing about God, the mystic knows God as God 
s himself, at least in part. That explains all the mystic's talk of union with 
But the mystic also has a heightened sense of being known by God. But 
knowing is a making of the world, and when God makes a world, he 
it well. Perhaps in the mystical revelation, God simply lets the mystic ex-
' even if not understand, how God's knowing the world(s) is also the 
g of the world(s). This extends to the mystic as well. So God's revelation 
knowing the mystic, changes the mystic. The mystic, in some way beyond 
ual ken, knows the way God knows, for the mystic is known by God, and 
God's knowing, the mystic knows himself and God as well. All other know!-
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edge of worldly things ceases to be of import, except as filtered through the pr· 
mary knowing granted in the mystical experience. 
IRREALIST: So what we have suggested, according to my contribution, is that 
human epistemizing does to some extent influence the world(s). But then that 
comes at the price of infinite regress and potential radical relativism. Your real" 
ist contribution is the objectivity that God supplies, and that objectivity both' 
stops the regress and the radical relativism while admitting that there is an irre~ 
alist aspect of the world(s). 
REALIST: Yes, that seems a fair summary.3 
3 The irrealist argument presented here was uncovered when I was considering what is 
wrong with Goodman's argument for irrealism. In a way, this argument is what I think Good, 
man should have said. I have him to thank, posthumously, for his inspiration. I also owe a debt 
of gratitude to Nicholas Wolterstorff for his criticism of Goodman. It was his way of putting 
Goodman off that indicated the direction to go. I want to thank William P. Alston, Rene van 
Woudenberg, Caleb Miller, and Laura Smit for pushing me to state what the real issue is. I 
might add that not one of Bill, Rene, Caleb, or Laura is an irrealist. I'm not even sure I am. 
Neither am I sure, nevertheless, how to respond to the argument presented by the irrealist here, 
without begging the question against irrealism. 
